Signal honesty may be compromised when heightened competition provides incentive for signal exaggeration. Some degree of honesty might be maintained by intrinsic handicap costs on signalling or through imposition of extrinsic costs, such as social punishment of low-quality cheaters. Thus, theory predicts a delicate balance between signal enhancement and signal reliability that varies with degree of social competition, handicap cost and social cost. We investigated whether male sexual signals of the electric fish Brachyhypopomus gauderio become less reliable predictors of body length when competition provides incentives for males to boost electric signal amplitude. As expected, social competition under natural field conditions and in controlled laboratory experiments drove males to enhance their signals. However, signal enhancement improved the reliability of the information conveyed by the signal, as revealed in the tightening of the relationship between signal amplitude and body length. Signal augmentation in male B. gauderio was independent of body length, and thus appeared not to be curtailed through punishment of low-quality (small) individuals. Rather, all individuals boosted their signals under high competition, but those whose signals were farthest from the predicted value under low competition boosted signal amplitude the most. By elimination, intrinsic handicap cost of signal production, rather than extrinsic social cost, appears to be the basis for the unexpected reinforcement of electric signal honesty under social competition. Signal modulation may provide its greatest advantage to the signaller as a mechanism for handicap disposal under low competition rather than as a mechanism for exaggeration of quality under high competition. Ó 2012 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Dynamic signals may be reliable indicators of current quality since they can respond rapidly to changes in the individual's condition (Hill et al. 1999; Torres & Velando 2003) . However, the lability of dynamic signals may allow signallers to transiently escape signalling constraints and temporarily exaggerate their quality and thereby decrease signal reliability. Signal exaggeration can benefit a signaller when there is high reward incentive for increased signalling (Andersson 1994; Searcy & Nowicki 2005) . Although signalling systems can survive a small degree of unreliability without completely impairing the stability of the communication system (Johnstone & Grafen 1993; Kokko 1997) , a high prevalence of cheating in the population would render signals meaningless for receivers and result in receivers ignoring the signals (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Johnstone & Grafen 1993) . Thus, for signals to remain evolutionarily stable, dishonesty has to be contained.
According to the handicap principle, signal honesty is maintained when the advertising signal meets the following three conditions: (1) the expression of the signal depends on a sexually selected phenotypic trait of the signaller, (2) signals are expensive to produce or maintain and (3) the costs of signalling rise faster than its benefits (Zahavi 1975 (Zahavi , 1977 Grafen 1990) . A signal that satisfies the first condition is referred to as an 'index' if it is physically associated with the sexually selected trait of the signaller (Maynard Smith & Harper 1995) . Signalling cost may include the physiological cost of producing or maintaining the signal, the cost of predation risk that comes with increased conspicuousness due to signalling, and/or social cost from increased confrontation with conspecific males.
Signallers are thought to benefit by producing costly signals when signalling incentive is high, such as during intensified competition, high resource value, or when future reproductive opportunities are reduced. Empirical studies show that competition often induces males to increase signalling effort, producing more conspicuous and costly signals (Kodric-Brown & Brown 1984; Ryan 1985; Endler 1995; Franchina et al. 2001; Salazar & Stoddard 2009 ). Likewise, males typically signal more in the presence of
